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likely that in the near future it will be necessary to regulate rainmaking,
not only by rules of nation-wide application, but also by international treaty.
Gus D.

HATFIELD, JR.

INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC FRAUD AND RELIEF AGAINST
JUDGMENTS
Closely akin to the doctrine of res adjudicataI is that which will not
allow a court of equity to grant relief against a fraudulently acquired judgment unless the fraud is shown to have been "extrinsic" or collateral rather
than "intrinsic" fraud. 2 According to this rule, to warrant equitable relief
against a judgment on the ground of fraud, it must appear that the fraud
was practiced in the very act of obtaining the judgment. Relief is granted
on the theory that through fraud extrinsic and collateral to the actual proceedings before the court, the unsuccessful party has been prevented from
fully presenting his case, and hence that there has never been a real contest
before the court on the subject matter of the suit.3 On the other hand, the
rule is that an issue or controversy which has once been tried and passed on
4
by a court should not be retried in an action for relief against the judgment,
since otherwise litigation would be interminable.
The origin of the doctrine, and the authority most cited in the cases
on the problem is United States v. Throckinorton, in which Mr. Justice
Miller laid down the governing principle as follows:
"There are no maxims of the law more firmly established, or of more value in the
administration of justice, than the two which are designed to prevent repeated litigation
between the same parties in regaird to the same subject of controversy; namely, inlerest
rei publicae, ut sit finis litium, and nento debet bis vexari pro una et eadam causa....
1. "When a tribunal having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties has
once decided a question, it is res adjudicata between those parties, and cannot be relitigated
by them in an original proceeding before another tribunal." State ex rel. Roberts v.
Lawrence, 76 Kan. 940, 92 Pac. 1131, 1133 (1907).
2. "Extrinsic" fraud is often referred to as "fraud in the procurement." See, e.g.,
Chermak v. Chermak, 227 Ind. 625, 88 N.E.2d 250 (1949).
3. Hogan v. Scott, 186 Ala. 310, 65 So. 209 (1914) ; Bergin v. Haight, 99 Cal. 52, 33
Pac. 760 (1893) (collusion between administrator and attorney) ; Spencer v. Vigneaux,
20 Cal. 442 (1862) (concealment of partial payment) ; De Louis v. Meek, 2 Greene 55,
50 Am. Dec. 491 (Iowa 1849); Keith v. Alger, 114 Tenn. 1, 85 S.W. 71 (1904); cf.
Maddox v. Apperson, 82 Tenn. 596 (1885).
4. It is said that where the same matter has been actually tried, a "party is estopped
to set up such fraud, because the judgment is the highest evidence, and cannot be controverted." Greene v. Greene, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 361, 366 (1854). The simple answer to
such a statement is that this gives no reason; it merely states the result. See Warner v.
Blakeman, 4 Keyes 487, 507 (N.Y. 1868).
5. See 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1233 (5th ed., Tuttle, 1925) ; 3 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURIsPRUDENcE § 919b (5th ed., Symon, 1941) ; Note, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 79 (1934) ; 9
CALIF. L. Rrv. 155 (1920) ; 21 COL. L. REv. 268 (1921) ; 36 ILL. L. REV. 894 (1942) ; 34

MARQ. L. REV. 138 (1950).
6. 98 U.S. 61, 25 L. Ed. 93 (1878).
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But there is an admitted exception to this general rule in cases where, by reason of
something done by the successful party to a suit, there was in fact no adversary trial or
decision of the issue in the case. Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by
keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant
never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff;
or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party
and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells
out his client's interest to the other side,--these, and similar cases which show that
there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for
which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment or
decree, and open the case for a new and a fair hearing... In all these cases, and many
others which have been examined, relief has been granted, on the ground that, by some
fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree,
that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court. On the
other hand, the doctrine is equally well settled that the court will not set aside a judgment because it was founded on a fraudulent instrument or perjured evidence, or for
any matter which was actually presented and considered in the judgment assailed."'

The Throckmorton case was followed thirteen years later by the California court in Pico v. Cohn,8 and these two cases are commonly regarded

is the leading decisions on the problem. 9 Both, it seems, have succeeded in
evolving from the facts of a particular case a rigid rule, and, with sweeping
statements of doctrine, established a rule restricting equity courts of the

future in applying the facts to the particular case at hand. 10
But the present weight of the Throckmorton case would perhaps not be

as great" if the courts were to consider the procedural differences existing
at that time. Most of the cases on which the Throckmorton decision relies
were actions in equity for new trials;12 the case itself involved an action
to "vacate" a judgment. Justice Miller said that a bill in chancery "was
at that time a very common mode of obtaining a new trial."' 3 The passage
of statutes governing the granting of new trials eliminates the necessity of
many actions in equity for that purpose. Diligence on the part of a losing
party will generally enable him to seek a new trial within the statutory
period.' 4 Frequent applications to enjoin judgments were made in equity
before the practice of awarding new trials was introduced into the common
7. 98 U.S. at 65-66.
8. 91 Cal. 129, 25 Pac. 970, 27 Pac. 537, 13 L.R.A. 336, 25 Am. St. Rep. 159 (1891).
9. See Note, 126 A.L.R. 390 (1940).
10. "In Tucker v. Stewart, 121 Iowa, 714, 97 N.W. 148, we said that the rule
announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in U.S. v. Throckmorton, supra,
is that uniformly followed in this state. This settles the matter for this jurisdiction. .. ."
Graves v. Graves, 132 Iowa 199, 109 N.W. 707, 709, 10 L.R.A. (N.s.) 216, 10 Am. Cas.
1104 (1906).
11. For collections of cases, see authorities in note 5, supra.
12. Railroad Company v. Neal, 1 Woods 353, 20 Fed. Cas. 183, No. 11,534 (C.C.E.D.
Tex. 1870); Riddle v. Baker, 13 Cal. 296 (1859); Borland v. Thorton, 12 Cal. 440
(1859) ; Dixon v. Graham, 16 Iowa 310 (1864).
13. 98 U.S. at 67.
14. Lack of diligence appears to be the principal reason for the refusal of equity courts
to act in the cases cited in the Throckmorton opinion. See note 12, supra.
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law courts. 15 Mr. Justice Clifford, in Crinz v. Handley,'0 said, "Until the
practice of granting new trials in courts of law was introduced, every reason
existed why equitable relief should be afforded; but as the courts of law
now exercise that power very liberally, especially in case of fraud or unavoidable accident, a resort to equity is seldom necessary or successful." 17
This restraint seems to be the ideology leading up to the Throckmorton rule,
the courts sometimes ignoring, in refusing relief against intrinsic fraud, that
the proper relief is the enjoining of the person of the guilty party, and that
such action does not affect the judgment of the law court, as in the granting
of new trials.
Because of the harshness of the Throckinorton rule, it has caused much
embarrassment to courts which give it token recognition, and yet seek t(
avoid its harshness by terming certain acts "extrinsic" fraud in order to
grant relief against unconscionably acquired judgments.' 8 Most courts have
departed from the Throckmarton rule where there exists a fiduciary or
other relationship such that the perpetrator of the fraud owes a duty to
disclose the facts to the injured party,' 9 even though perjury, the most
obvious form of "intrinsic" fraud, is committed.20 And in the case of judgments on arbitration awards, most courts have made an exception to the
general rule.2 1 Some courts have shown by their inner turmoil that the
harshness of the rule is recognized, and yet go very far to sustain it.22
But the rule has never had unanimous adherence. The British courts
have not drawn the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud, their
attitude being that fraud vitiates everything it touches,23 and that equity
has the power to interpose and refuse to allow a successful litigant to receive the fruits of his fraud perpetrated in a former action.2 4 Relief has
15. Crim v. Handley, 94 U.S. 652, 24 L. Ed. 216 (1876). See 15 R.C.L., Judgments
§ 214 (1917) ; Note, 32 L.R.A. (N.s.) 905, 929 (1911).
16. Crim v. Handley, supra note 15.
17. 94 U.S. at 658.
18. See e.g., Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Callicotte, 267 Fed. 799, 16 A.L.R. 386 (8th
Cir. 1920) ; McGuinness v. Superior Ct., 196 Cal. 222, 237 Pac. 42 (1925) ; Note, 126
A.L.R. 390, 402, n.37 (1940).
19. Sohler v. Sohler, 135 Cal. 323, 67 Pac. 282 (1902) (mother and minor children);
3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1235 (5th ed., Tuttle, 1925) ; Note, 23 CALIF. L. REv. 79, 83
(1934).
20. Silva v. Santos, 138 Cal. 536, 71 Pac. 703 (1903) ; Aldrich v. Barton, 138 Cal.
220, 71 Pac. 169 (1902).
21. See 49 HAv. L. REv. 327 (1935).
22. See, for example, the recent case of Alexander v. Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d 996
(Tex. 1950), where the court refused to relieve the plaintiff of a default judgment which
the justice had been induced by fraud to render against him. Justice Smedley, dissenting,
says that the judgment treats "the applicable equitable rules as inflexible rules, ignoring
the fact that the rules of equity are in a measure flexible and adaptable to particular
exigencies." Id. at 1003.
23. Abouloff v. Oppenheimer & Co., 10 Q.B.D. 295 (C.A. 1882); Flower v. Lloyd,
10 Ch.D. 327 (C.A. 1879).
24. Cole v. Langford, [1898] 2 Q.B. 36; Vadala v. Lawes, 25 Q.B.D. 310 (C.A. 1890).
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probably been given more freely against foreign judgments, 25 "but it is
said to be equally applicable to judgments obtained in England; and I see
no reason for holding that a judgment in a division court is to be exempted
from the operation of the principle." 26 And in an early case, no distinction
was made between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud when a new trial was granted
in equity where it was shown that the former judgment was founded upon
2 7
a forged instrument.
Street, J., said in Johnston v. Barkley,2 8 "It is obviously necessary in
order to prevent an abuse of the right to have a judgment re-opened upon
the ground of fraud, that the fraud should be that of the party who has obtained the judgment; that it should be clearly made out; and that it should
have undoubtedly been at the foundation of the decision which has been
attacked; and the attacking party must be prepared to shew this upon an
application to stay his action as frivolous and vexatious."'29 But this limitation is applicable to all suits in equity, and the facts behind each case may
be looked to individually. 0
The Throckniorton rule has been flatly rejected in Wisconsin. 31 The
requirement of a very high degree of proof in suits in equity to enjoin a
"victor from enjoying the spoils" of his fraud in Wisconsin 32 seems largely
to eliminate the principal objection to actions of this sort--i.e., that there
would be no end of litigation. 3 The Wisconsin rule is not abrogated by a
procedural rule similar to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3 4 the independent action after term being available as in the Federal
Courts. 35 Neither does the Wisconsin practice seem to be encouraging exces36
sive and endless litigation.
"The numerous American decisions bearing on the point, and the near absence of

English and Canadian ones, afford ground for the contention that a general assurance in
the law that a judgment obtained by perjury will be protected presents a temptation to
25. See Note, 32 L.R.A. (I.s.) 905 (1911).
26. Johnston v. Barkley, 10 Ont. L.R. 724, 728 (1905). "I do not find the cases upon
the subject to turn upon the difference suggested . .. between judgments obtained by
extrinsic fraud and those obtained by perjury at the trial." Id. at 727.
27, Coddrington v. Webb, 2 Vern. 240, 23 Eng. Rep. 755 (Ch.1691).

28. 10 Ont. L.R. 724 (1905).
29. Id. at 728. See Boring v. Ott, 138 Wis. 260, 119 N.W. 865, 868, 22 HARv. L. REv.
600 (1909).

30. This appears to be the viewpoint of Chief Justice Marshall in Marine Ins. v.
Hodgson, 7 Cranch 332, 336, 3 L. Ed. 362 (U.S. 1813).
31. An exhaustive summary of the problem is contained in Boring v. Ott, 138 Wis.
260, 119 N.W. 865, 22 HARV. L. REv. 600 (1909), which was reinforced by the Wisconsin
court in Laun v. Kipp, 155 Wis. 347, 145 N.W. 183 (1914). The ruling is apparently
not affected by the recent case of Werner v. Riemer, 255 Wis. 386, 39 N.W.2d 457
(1949), 34 MARQ.L. Rav. 138 (1950), since that case concerned a suit at law where the
plaintiff sought to relitigate the question of fraud which had been passed on before.
32. Discussed with approval, Note, 23 CALIF. L. Rv. 79, 84 (1934).

33. See note 5 supra.
34. Wis. STAT. § 269.46 (1949).
35. Gimbel v. Wehr, 165 Wis. 1, 160 N.W. 1080, 1082 (1917).
36. See Note, 23 CALIF. L. REv. 79, 84 (1934); 49 HI-Av. L. Ray. 327 (1935).
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give false testimony and that, in the interests of something more nearly approaching
a true 'administration of justice,' litigants might better be assured that a judgment
attributable to clearly provable perjury cannot be held in the face of due diligence of the
opposing litigant"'

There has been some question as to whether the new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure s have abolished the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud in the Federal courts. 39 But Rule 60(b) merely abolishes the
distinction in authorizing relief by the same court that handed down the
judgment-relief to be given on motion no later than one year after judgment. This rule concludes by providing that "the procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or
by an independent action." 40 This "independent action" is the same action in
equity herein discussed, and where "the independent action is resorted to,
41
the limitations of time are those of laches or statutes of limitation."
In most jurisdictions, therefore, the Throckmorton rule has not been
changed or overruled, 42 and the distinction between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" fraud still troubles the courts. 43 Its validity is doubtful. By adverting
to the procedural aspects of the cases originally establishing the rule, it is
possible to distinguish them. The principal attribute of equity jurisdiction is
its power to act upon the person of an individual to restrain him from doing
something which conscience and justice demand that he not do. This is
the precise remedy which should and can be applied to the question of
fraudulently acquired judgments. "In cases of this character the injunction
acts not on the court rendering the judgment, but on the party."'4 4 It is not
suggested that equity grant a new trial or reverse the decision of the law
court granting a fraudulently acquired judgment, but that it should enjoin
37. Note, 126 A.L.R. 390, 394 n.11 (1940).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
39. Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 640
et seq. (1946); 34 MARQ. L. REV. 138, 140 (1950).
40. Italics supplied.
41. Editor's notes to Rule 60(b). See Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil
Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 659 (1946). See id. at 650-53 for comparison with similar
rule in California.
42. The case of Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, 12 Sup. Ct. 62, 35 L. Ed. 870
(1891), is often cited as being in conflict with the Throcknzorton case. See, e.g., Publicker
v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 949, 952, 126 A.L.R. 386 (3d Cir. 1939) ; Boring v. Ott, 138 Wis.
260, 119 N.W. 865, 868 (1909). But the court did not in fact make a direct holding on the
question, see 3 FREE-MAN, JUDGMENTS § 1233 (5th ed., Tuttle, 1925), merely incidentally
saying that "it might be that relief could be granted by reason" of the facts alleged. 141
U.S. at 601.
43. Interesting recent cases concerning the procedure for obtaining relief from judg-

ments acquired by extrinsic fraud on the court include: Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 Sup. Ct. 997, 88 L. Ed. 1250 (1944) ; Root Refining Co.
v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1948).
44. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Callicotte, 267 Fed. 799, 810, 16 A.L.R. 386 (8th
Cir. 1920).
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the successful party from enforcing the judgment. 45 Even if courts continue
to refuse to grant this discretionary relief in the case of "intrinsic" fraud,
they may still look to the cases where mere token recognition has been given
to the Throckmorton doctrine, 46 expanding the definition of extrinsic fraud
to allow more equitable relief. 47 And there is certainly no adequate reason for
continuing to apply the distinction between the two kinds of fraud where
motions for relief before the same court are concerned. The time for these
motions is limited by statute or court iule and the objection that a judgment would never be final does not apply. This change, embodied in the
Federal Rules, is the minimum modification of the Throckmorton rule to be
urged.
HAROLD

C.

DEDMAN

45. See 15 R.C.L., Judgments § 214 (1917); Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from

Civil Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 654 (1946).
46. Note 18, supra.
47. Bolden v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & I. Co., 215 Ala. 334, 110 So. 574, 49 A.L.R.
1206 (1925) ; El Reno Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 41 Okla. 297, 137 Pac. 700, 50 L.R.A.
(N.s.)

1064 (1913).

